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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VIRGIL E. NORTON, Appellant, 
vs. 
DEPARTMENT OF E.M:PLOY- CaseNo. 
MENT SECURITY, AND BOARD 11292 
OF REVIEW OF THE INDUS-
TRIAL COl\fMISSION OF UTAH, 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Board of 
Review of the Industrial Commission which affirmed 
a decision of the Appeals Referee denying unemploy-
ment benefits to the appellant for the period commenc-
ing January 21, 1968, on the ground that he was regis-
tered at and attending school. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There is no dispute as to the facts. 
The appellant filed a claim for benefits effective 
Ja11uary 21, 1968 (R-15). At that time he was attending 
I 
Westminster College full-time (R-16) and at the time 
of the hearing before the Appeals Referee on April 10, 
1968, he was registered at and attending 'Vestminster 
(R-17). The tuition fee was $403 a semester (R-17). 
During 1967 (his base y€;ar under the Employment 
Security Act) he was employed by Trane Company 
and was terminated from that employment on January 
19, 1968 ( R-15) . During 1967 he earned wages in the ' 
amount of $5,229.52 (R-16). During that year he 
attended Westminster College during the periods J anu· 
ary 1 to 27 and September 14 to December 31 (R-16). 
While attending school during his base period 1967 he 
earned $2,058.25 (R-3) (R-16-17). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
1 
SECURITY AND THE BOARD OF REVIEW 
PROPERLY APPLIED THE PROVISIONS 
OF THE EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT, 
CHAPTER 35-4 UCA TO THE FACTS OF THE 
CASE. 
Benefits under the Act are computed on the basis 
of an individual's earnings during his base period. Sec· ' 
tion 35-4-22 (b) defines the "base period" as follows: 
"35-4-22 (b) The term 'base period' shall mean 
the four completed calendar quarters next pre· 
ceding the first day of the individual's benefit 
year." 
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The term "benefit year" is defined as follows: 
"35-4-22 ( d) ( 1) The term 'benefit year' means 
th.e fifty-two consecu~ive week period beginning 
with the first week with respect to which an indi-
vidual files for benefits and is found to have an 
insured status." 
The appellant's "benefit year" commenced January 
21, 1968 (R-15) and his base year became the four quar-
ters of 1967. During 1967, he earned wages in the 
amount of $5,229.52 (R-16). While attending school 
during his "base period" 1967, he earned wages in the 
amount of $2,058.25 (R-03) which did not constitute 
the majority of his earnings during his "base period" 
so as to escape the statutory disqualification of Section 
35-4-5 (g) which provides: 
"35-4-5 An individual shall be ineligible for 
benefits or for purposes of establishing a waiting 
period: 
"(g) for any week in which he is registered at 
and attending an established school, or is on vaca-
tion during or between successive quarters or 
semesters of such school attendance; unless the 
major portion of his wages for insured work dur-
ing his base period was for services performed 
while attending school, provided, however, that 
notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection 
an otherwise eligible individual shall not be ineli-
gible to receive benefits while attending night 
school, a part-time training course, or a course 
approved by the commission; and provided fur-
ther that satisfactory attendance and satisfac-
tory progress in a course approved by the com-
mission shall be evidence of availability." (Italics 
ours.) 
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Under the provisions of Section 5 (g) therefore, the 
appellant was disqualified because he was registered at 
and attending school during the weeks in 1968 for which 
he was claiming benefits. He earned less than the major 
portion of. his base period wages while attending school 
and there was no basis on which to find that the statutory 
disqualification for school attendance was removed. Had 
he not worked at all while attending school in 1967, he 
of course would also have been ineligible for benefits 
while attending school. 
If during his benefit year (which commenced J anu- , 
ary 21, 1968) he ceases to attend school he will, if un-
employed and able and available for work, be entitled 
to benefits upon making application on a week by week 
basis. 
We agree with Counsel that in 1967 and part of 
January, 1968, the appellant worked full time. During 
the period for which he is claiming benefits he was unem-
ployed and a full-time student and, as such, ineligible 
for benefits under the Act. The applicable provision of 
the Act was properly applied to the undisputed facts. 
POINT II 
SECTION 35-4-5 (g), IS CONSTITUTIONAL 1 
AND DOES NOT VIOLATE ARTICLE 1, SEC-
TION 2, OF THE CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
OR THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES. 
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The Utah Employment Security Act 35-4 UCA 
provides that certain classes of employers will pay un-
employment compensation contributions into a fund 
based on the wages paid to certain classes of employ-
ments. The Act excludes certain other employments and 
employers. It disqualifies individuals who are not able 
and available for work and who are not unequivocally 
in the labor market and immediately ready to accept 
employment. It disqualifies persons on strike, and dis-
qualifies pregnant women for certain weeks before and 
after childbirth. 
In most respects, its definitions of employers, 
covered employments and disqualifications are similar 
to those of the several other states of the union. In Utah, 
as in most states, the employers alone pay contributions 
into the fund. Employees do not pay contributions. 
Their rights under the Act are purely statutory. 
Prior to 1963, Section 5 ( g) read as follows: 
"(g) For any week in which he is attending 
an established school, excluding night school, 
national defense training course or a course des-
ignated by the commission, unless it can be shown 
to the satisfaction of the commission that he is 
unemployed through no fault of his own and 
that he is actively seeking work and will quit 
school to accept full-time work during customary 
working hours; provided that when the major 
portion of his wages for insured work during 
his base period was for services performed while 
attending school; the foregoing eligibility re-
quirement that he will quit school to accept full-
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time work during customary working hours shall 
not apply; and provided further, that the provi- i 
sions of this section shall not be construed as to ' 
grant benefits to an individual who is not avail-
able for substantially full-time work." 
In 1963, for reasons not in the record, the Legisla-
ture amended Section 5 (g). 
Counsel for appellant on page 5 of his brief points 
out one probable reason for the amendment. He said, 
"It is easy to see that many abuses had arisen prior to 
the enactment of this act ... " (meaning the 1963 amend-
ment), "or could have arisen where a student, going to 
college on a full-time basis, would work during the sum- , 
mer months to earn enough money to go back to school, 
and because of his termination of his employment after 
summer employment then be entitled to unemployment 
compensation." (Italics ours.) 
The Legislature acted within the scope of its author-
ity in denying benefits to persons attending school unless 
they met certain requirements. 
This Court in Combined Metals Reduction Com· 
pany et al v. The Industrial Commission of Utah, IOI 1 
U. 230 116 P.2d 929, said: 
"Nor of course is it a mystery that there may 
be situations not covered by the act deserving 
of help." 
The Court then quoted from the case of Carmichael 
v. Southern Coal and Coke Co., 301 US 495, 57 S. Ct. 
868, 81 L. Ed. 1245, 109 A.L.R. 1327. 
G 
The Carmichael case is a landmark case dealing 
with the rights of State Legislatures to define employ-
ers, employments and unemployment benefit entitle-
ments. It was argued before the Court that the state 
act in question was unconstitutional because it taxed 
some employers and not others; that it covered some 
employments and excluded others, and that benefits 
were not uniformly provided. 
The United States Supreme Court in Carmichael 
(Supra) said: 
" ( b) Extension of Benefits. The present 
scheme of unemployment relief is not subject 
to any constitutional infirmity, as respondents 
argue, because it is not limited to the indigent 
or because it is extended to some less deserving 
than others, such as those discharged for mis-
conduct. While we may assume that the state 
could have limited its award of unemployment 
benefits to the indigent and to those who had not 
been rightfully discharged from their employ-
ment, it was not bound to do so. Poverty is one 
but not the only evil consequence of unemploy-
ment. Among the benefits sought by relief is the 
avoidance of destitution, and of the gathering 
cloud of evils which beset the worker, his family 
and the community after wages cease and before 
destitution begins. 
" ( c) Restriction of Benefits. Appellees again 
challenge the tax by attacking as arbitrary the 
classification adopted by the legislature for the 
distribution of unemployment benefits. Only the 
employees of those subject to the tax share in the 
benefits. Appellees complain that the relief is 
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withheld from many as deserving as those who 
receive benefits. The choice of beneficiaries, like 
the selection of the subjects of the tax, is thus 
said to be f>O arbitrary and discriminatory as to 
infringe the Fourteenth Amendment and deprive 
the statute of any public purpose. 
"What we have said as to the validity of the 
choice of the subjects of the tax is applicable 
in large measure to the choice of beneficiaries 
of the relief. In establishing a system of unem-
ployment benefits the Legislature is not bound 
to occupy the whole field. It may strike at the 
evil where it is most felt (citing cases) or where 
it is most practicable to deal with it, (citing 
cases) . It may exclude others whose need is less, 
(citing cases) or whose effective aid is attended 
by inconvenience which is greater (citing cases) 
"As we cannot say that these considerations 
did not lead to the selection of the classes of 
employees entitled to unemployment benefits, 
and as a state of facts may reasonably be con-
ceived which would support the selection, its 
constitutionality must be sustained . . ." 
In the case of Chamberlin vs. Andrews, 271 N.Y. ' 
1, 2 NE 2d 22, 106 A.L.R. 1519, the court said: 
"It is said that this is taxation for the benefit . 
of a special class, not the public at large and thus 
1 
the purpose is essentially private. The legislature 
after investigation, has found the facts to be 
that those who are to receive benefits under the 
act are the ones most likely to be out of employ· 
ment in times of depression. The courts cannot 
investigate these facts and should not attempt 
to do so. The briefs submitted show that the clas· 
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sification or selection made by the legislature has 
followed investigation and has sought to reach 
the weakest spot. Experience may show this to 
be a mistake. No law can act with certainty; it 
measures reasonable probabilities. 
"Judicial inquiry does not concern itself with 
the accuracy of the legislative finding, but only 
with' the question whether it so lacks any reason-
able basis as to be arbitrary." (citing cases) 
(Italics ours.) 
In Dominion Hotel, Incorporated v. State of Ari-
zona, 249 U.S. 265, Mr. Justice Holmes said: 
"The Fourteenth Amendment is not a peda-
gogical requirement of the impracticable. The 
equal protection of laws does not mean that all 
occupations that are called by the same name 
must be treated in the same way. 
"The only question is whether we can say on 
our judicial knowledge that the legislature of 
Arizona could not have had any reasonable 
ground for believing that there were such public 
considerations for the distinction made by the 
present law. The deference due the judgment of 
the legislature on the matter has been emphasized 
again and again." 
In the case of Acierno v. General Fireproofing, 
144 NE 2d 201 ( 1957) the appellee claimant was at-
tending Youngstown College on a nine-hour schedule. 
Ohio law disqualified if he is: 
" ... or a student regularly attending an estab-
lished educational institution during the school 




"We are not confronted here with the propo-
sition of an individual holding a part-time or 
full-time job while he is attending an established 
educational institution full time. Under such 
circumstances, the legislative intent comes 
through clearly that such an individual would be 
'regularly attending' within the meaning of the 
law and, whatever view this court might have 
of the legislative policy of such a provision it i 
would have no power to vary the clear intent of 1 
such policy." 
The court then concluded that a student not taking 
a full-time course was not "regularly attending." 
In Cornell v. Schroeder et al., 114 NE 2d 595, 
the claimant for benefits was denied unemployment 
compensation benefits while attending school. The 
statute disqualified: 
" . . . if he is a student regularly attending 
an established educational institution during the 
school term or customary vacation periods within 
the school term." 
The court said: 
"The referee refused to recognize the appli· 
cability of that section to this record, largely on 
the ground that the settled policy of a libe~al 
construction of the act justified a refusal of dis-
qualification under the section. 
"This we find to be error ... Section 1345 - 6 
subd. c ( 9) Ohio General Code is very definite 
and unambiguous, and though this court can see 
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no reason why such a penalty should be attached 
to a desire for education, yet as long as the statute 
is there the court cannot. judicially amend the 
law nor change its meaning when that statute 
is susceptible of only one interpretation." 
Counsel argues that Section 5 (g) is unconstitu-
tional because it denies benefits to day students and 
permits the payment of benefits to those attending night 
school. (Brief 7, 8) . 
Section 5 (g) does not deny benefits to individuals 
attending school in the daytime on a part-time basis or 
who are attending courses in the daytime which are ap-
proved by the commission. 
When the appellant registered at Westminster and 
paid his tuition he became a full-time student (R-17). 
Even though this Court were inclined to substitute 
its judgment for that of the legislature in determining 
whether the legislature had a reasonable basis for its 
enactment, it could not do so without making an inde-
pendent investigation. 
The record contains no evidence which would en-
able the court to compare night school students with 
day students attending part-time training courses or 
day students attending school full time. 
Counsel for appellant (Brief, 9) says 
"There is no rational basis for singling out an 
employee who goes to night school from an em-
ployee who goes to day school." 
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His contention is not, and cannot be predicated on 
the record in this case. We do not have knowledge as 
to the rationale of the legislature or the considerations 
prompting its action. 
The appellant in his appeal to the Appeals Referee 
stated the following grounds: 
"I agree that, according to the law, I am not , 
eligible to draw benefits while I am in school. . 
I do not agree with the law, and I am using this 
method to see what I can do about the law." 
(R-26).. 
Nor was the constitutional issue before the Board 
of Review. (See appellant's appeal ( R-13) . ) 
We do not question the right of counsel to raise the , 
constitutional issue. This arises out of an administrative : 
hearing at which counsel had no opportunity to assist ; 
in making a record which would enable this court to , 
examine his argument that the legislature had no "ra· 
tional basis" for the enactment of Section 5 ( g) . 
Counsel for Respondent are aware of the facts con· 
sidered in the enactment of the section, but are, in the · 
absence of such facts from the record, precluded from , 
presenting an argument on those facts. We also will : 
not make any assumptions. ' 
In light of the Carmichael case (Supra) and 
the numerous cases cited therein the court cannot con· 
elude that the facts considered by the legislature would 
not support its enactment of Section 5 ( g) . It is the 
prerogative of the legislature and not the judiciary 
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to choose the beneficiaries of the Act. The legislature 
is free to decide where the impact of unemployment is 
greatest; where it is most practicable to deal with it; 
and whether an individual registered at and attending 
8chool full time is less entitled to unemployment benefits 
than are individuals attending night school, part-time 
training courses during nighttime or daytime, or courses 
approved by the commission. 
SUMMARY 
It is respectfully submitted that the law was prop-
erly applied to the facts and that the law does not 
violate the equal protection guarantees of the Utah and 
the United States Constitutions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN, Attorney General 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondents 
13 
